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The Rise and fall of the Assisted Dying (No2) Bill 2015 – a missed opportunity? 
Claudia Carr, Senior Lecturer, University of Hertfordshire. 
Introduction 
Although the offence of suicide was decriminalised by section 1 of the Suicide Act 1961, assisting a 
suicide remains a criminal offence punishable by a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment. 
Section 2(1) states that a person commits an offence if he ‘does an act capable of encouraging or 
assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another personi’ and his ‘act was intended to encourage 
or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide’ii.   
One of the high profile cases that helped garner significant public support to legalise assisted suicide 
is that of Debbie Purdyiii. She suffered from multiple sclerosis and sought an assurance from the DPP 
that her husband would not be prosecuted if he assisted her to end her life. The House of Lords held 
that the Code in force at the time provided insufficient guidance as to the factors that could lead to 
prosecution, and the House ordered the DPP to produce a policy which clearly set out the factors 
likely to lead (or not to lead) to a prosecution. As a result, new DPP Guidelines were introduced,iv the 
effect of which is that where the ‘suspect’ is motivated entirely by compassion and the ‘victim’ has 
expressed a clear and settled wish to end their life, a prosecution is now unlikely. Whilst the DPP 
Guidelines were broadly welcomed and signalled that those who assist someone to die through 
wholly compassionate motives should not be prosecuted, the Guidelines have been criticised as 
being ambiguous, use the terms ‘victim’ and ‘suspect’ and are used retrospectively. What they do 
not do, is to provide a person with the right to die at a time and manner of their choosing which the 
Assisted Dying Bill sought to do. As a nation, we appear to be exporting assisted death tourism to 
Switzerland, rather than allowing people the right to die at home in their home country surrounded 
by those who they love.   
The Assisted Dying (No2) Bill  
The Assisted Dying Bill was introduced in 2013 and was the fifth such Bill to come before Parliament 
is the past 10 years, but it differed from those previously introduced due to a background of 
significant public support and high profile cases that had come before the Courtsv. A 2015 Populous 
pollvi of 5,000 participants carried out by the national campaign organization, Dignity in Dying, 
showed that 82% of the public supported the Assisted Dying Bill and that there was clear popular 
appetite for legalisation of assisted suicide, a sentiment not reflected by those in Parliament. 
Supported by a number of high- profile personalities, including Professor Stephen Hawking, there 
was a groundswell of public opinion to support and permit a competent adult suffering from a 
terminal condition with less than 6 months to live, the right to determine for themselves the manner 
and time of their death.  
The Assisted Dying (No2) Bill was introduced into the current Parliamentary session by backbencher 
MP Rob Marris, when the Bill’s predecessor, the Assisted Dying Bill introduced by Lord Falconer in 
the House of Lords, ran out of Parliamentary time.  The Assisted Dying (No2) Bill would have 
permitted, with the High Court’s consent, a terminally ill person to request and be lawfully provided 
with assistance to end his or her life.vii Section 1 would only have applied if the High Court confirmed 
that the person had made a voluntary, clear, settled and informed wish to end his or her lifeviii, had 
made a declaration to that effectix and on the day that the declaration was made, was aged 18 or 
over, had the capacity to make the decision to end his or her life and had ordinarily been resident in 
England and Wales for not less than one year.x One of the key points to note is that, whilst a doctor 
may have prescribed medicine under the Act to enable that person to end their lifexi and an assisting 
health professional could have assisted the person with self-administrationxii, the final act of self-
administration remained with the patientxiii. 
However, on September 11th 2015, the House of Commons voted by a resounding majority against 
further progress of the Assisted Dying (No2) Bill, so as to prevent its progress to Committee Stage 
and stifle further debate.  Even before we look at the arguments that defined the demise of the Bill, 
it is disappointing to note that the Bill was not afforded the opportunity for greater debate, 
particularly since the deeply emotive and sensitive issue of assisted suicide had not been debated in 
depth in Parliament within the past 18 years.  
Lord Faulks commented on an earlier reading of the first Assisted Dying Bill saying that ‘any change 
in the law in this emotive area is an issue of individual conscience. In our view, it is rightly a matter 
for Parliament to decide rather than government policyxiv’ Indeed, Lord Mackay of Clashfern added 
that even though he was personally opposed to the Bill, he was ‘strongly in favour of it being 
afforded a Second Reading so that we may have the opportunity to discuss the many vitally 
important issues that it raises’.xv  
Many argue there is an unhappy relationship in the law which distinguishes between ‘killing’ and 
‘letting die’. The law respects the prevailing principle of autonomy in bioethics which enables a 
competent patient to refuse treatment even where it will lead to their deathxvi, but the person who 
suffers from a terminal condition and wishes to end their life, is legally unable to unless they are 
dependent on life sustaining treatment, which they would then be able to refuse.  
The following paragraphs outline some of the issues regarded by opponents of the Bill as  
fundamental flaws but the reader should appreciate these are simply snapshots of the issues and do 
not do justice to some of the lengthy and complex arguments.  
Safeguards 
The Bill would have allowed those patients with terminal conditions (admittedly few in number) to 
decide for themselves when to end their life. Opponents of the Bill argued that if assisted suicide 
were to be legal, the elderly or disabled would be vulnerable to undue influence or coercion and, 
would regard the option to end their life through assisted dying as an obligation to end their life, for 
fear of being an emotional or financial burden on their loved ones. Opponents argued that the noisy 
few who advocate assisted dying would outweigh the silence of the vulnerable majority. It was, for 
this reason, that judicial oversight was introduced in the House of Lords debates in November 2014, 
in order that each case would go before the court and so that the court could examine whether the 
person wishing to end their life has been coerced or subjected to undue influence. Arguably the 
judiciary are well equipped and sufficiently experienced to investigate and adjudicate on complex 
bioethics issues. One need only consider seminal cases such as those concerning withdrawing and 
withholding medical treatment from patients in vegetative or minimally conscious statexvii to be 
reassured that cases concerning assisted suicide would comfortably fall within the judiciary’s remit.  
Undoubtedly, protection of the vulnerable must be one of society’s primary concerns but the 
evidence from Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act 1997, upon which the Assisted Dying Bill is based, 
shows no abuse of the vulnerable. Statistics from Oregon’s DWDA 2014 annual report shows that of 
the 105 deaths under the Act (representing a tiny percentage of nearly 4 million), 68% were aged 65 
years of older, 72.95% were white and well educated.  
Life expectancy  
Section 2 (1) (b) of the Assisted Dying Bill stated that the terminally ill person is reasonably expected 
to die within six months. Herein lays one of several reasons why the Bill failed to proceed.  It is well 
known that it is challenging in the extreme to predict with any degree of certainty a patient’s 
prognosis. The Royal College of Physicians explained to a select committee which examined an 
earlier assisted dying Bill introduced by Lord Joffe, that ‘prognosticating may be better when 
somebody is within the last two or three weeks of their life…when they are six or months away from 
it, it is actually pretty desperately hopeless as an accurate factor’xviii. The select committee 
recommended ‘if a future bill should include terminal illness as a qualifying condition, this should be 
defined in such a way as to reflect the realities of clinical practice as regards accurate prognosis.’xix .  
Whilst the Assisted Dying (No2) Bill failed to pay heed to the advice of the select committee, there 
has been little suggestion as to how this issue of life expectancy could be better expressed. It is, by 
its own definition, fraught with difficulties. There may be many readers of this article who have first-
hand experience or have heard of a friend or relative who was given months to live and are still living 
several years later. However, what the Bill sought to achieve was a time frame within which a person 
could decide for themselves whether they wish to risk the debilitating and devastating progression 
of their condition over the ensuing months or determine for themselves the nature and time of their 
death. Indeed, this was precisely the circumstances of Jeffrey Spectorxx. Diagnosed with an 
inoperable tumour on the spine, which would eventually lead to paralysis, Mr Spector travelled to 
Dignitas in Switzerland in order to end his life at a time when he could still travel, albeit at a time 
earlier than he would have, if assisted suicide were legal in England and Wales. Being forced to travel 
to Dignitas in Switzerland as the only legal option to end one’s life is unsatisfactory and does not 
reflect the values of a compassionate societyxxi. Moreover, it prejudices both those who cannot 
afford the expensive trip and those who are too disabled to make the trip. Effectively, it only serves 
the ‘healthy unhealthy’ who may, more often than not, travel to end their life at time earlier than 
they otherwise would.  
Doctor-patient relationship 
Whilst empirical evidence does not support the fear that the vulnerable, infirmed or disabled will be 
unduly influenced to end their life, the additional fear is that the potential of assisted dying 
legislation would damage the doctor-patient relationship and the basic tenet for the medical 
professional; ‘above all do no harm.’ Whilst this principle is historic and engrained in the medical 
profession, one might argue whether the greater harm would be caused to the terminally ill patient 
who is unable to end their life when they are desperate to do so.  In any event, the fear is that the 
unscrupulous doctor will call ‘time’ on his elderly patient. However, the Bill only applied to a patient 
with a ‘terminal illness’ and not the healthy elderly patient or the disabled, and evidence from 
Oregon suggests that the DWDA 1997 has improved doctor’s understanding and communication 
with the terminally ill patientxxii and the Oregon Hospice Association found ‘no evidence that assisted 
dying has undermined Oregon’s end of life care of harmed the interests of vulnerable people’xxiii . 
Whilst the majority of doctors (and by far the majority of palliative care doctors) in the UK are 
opposed to assisted dying, 64% of doctors agreed that where a person suffers from a painful and 
incurable terminal condition, they should be allowed to end their own lifexxiv. Nevertheless, it was 
argued that people wishing to end their life would have to ‘shop’ around for sympathetic doctors, 
who would have no previous personal knowledge and understanding of the patient and whose 
professional reputation would then become synonymous with those who chose to end their lives. 
Perhaps the clarity that legislation brings in Oregon also creates a more honest and transparent 
relationship between doctor and patient, removing the elephant from the room.  
Palliative care 
Opponents argued that introduction of an Assisted Dying Bill would stifle the growth and funding of 
palliative care although there is clear evidence from the Oregon DWDA that this is not the case in 
Oregon. The British Medical Association states that ‘for most patients, effective and high quality 
palliative care can effectively alleviate distressing symptoms associated with the dying process and 
allay patients’ fears’xxv. Yet ‘distressing symptoms’ do not appear in the most common end of life 
concerns from Oregon. This suggests that the overriding reasons why those who want control over 
the time to end their life is not necessarily related to pain management, but to other factors 
concerning quality of life. Oregon’s DWDA 2014 Report confirms this very point, as issues of loss of 
autonomy accounted for 91.4% of the reasons behind choosing an assisted death, being unable to 
enjoy activities they were previously able to (86.7%) and a loss of dignity (71.4%). In fact, only 33% of 
those patients were concerned about inadequate pain control. Furthermore, given that 93% of all 
patients opting for an assisted death were enrolled in hospice care at the end of life, the option of an 
assisted death and the knowledge that a fatal prescription can be made available, may provide some 
level of comfort for the patient on a day to day basis.  
Sanctity of life 
The prevailing Conservative religious argument is that, since God gave life, it is only for God to take 
away. Life is a gift from God and not for us to dispose of as we wish. Suffering and pain is seen as 
part of life and assisted suicide exists contrary to religious teaching. Equally, there is also a secular 
view that human life is sacred. Lord Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury is recently reported 
as saying ‘There is nothing sacred about suffering, nothing holy about agony, and individuals should 
not be obliged to endure it’. Whilst his view has been criticised by the Church, it does represent a 
more compassionate view, which is also reflected in more Conservative (Reform) Judaism. To what 
extent should religious views be imposed upon a largely secular society where over 80% of those 
questioned, supported assisted suicide? Whilst many respect religious doctrine and would not 
contemplate an assisted death, it is difficult to maintain an argument that assisted suicide should not 
be introduced based solely on religious reasons. 
Slippery slope 
It was not necessarily the current provisions of the Assisted Dying (No2) Bill that led to its demise, 
rather the unresolvable concern that once doctors are permitted to provide patients with lethal 
drugs to self-administer and end their life, the limits to ending life will be removed. Perhaps there is 
some evidence to support the argument that permitting physician assisted suicide has indeed led to 
a more permissive approach in the Netherlands but slopes can be ‘sticky’ rather than inherently 
slippery. With tightly drafted legislation and appropriate safeguards, there is no reason to suspect 
that legislation which today, may allow assisted suicide for a person with a terminal condition will 
tomorrow permit assisted suicide to a patient with depression.  The fear of a slippery slope, whether 
justified or not, is no reason not to legislate in favour of assisted suicide. The key is to legislate with 
ultimately acceptable safeguards.  
Conclusion 
The debates and argument that arise in this controversial, yet crucially important question for 
society of assisted suicide are too lengthy for an article of this length to do justice to. Arguably, 
permitting assisted suicide will redefine society’s relationship with the dying, introducing a prevailing 
attitude that the elderly, ill or vulnerable have a moral duty to remove themselves from society, 
permitting the survival of only the healthy and able. However, death is inevitable; we all hope for a 
‘good’ death however that might be variously defined, but a good death is surely one with dignity. 
The Assisted Dying (No2) Bill would have, with the tightest of safeguards only applied to the very few 
people who, expressing their autonomy, wished to end their life. 
The defeat of the Assisted Dying (No2) Bill is a defeat for the concept of a good death. For those 
‘privileged’ enough to be able to travel to Switzerland, they can end their life largely alone in 
anonymity –this is not a good death, just the only available option, save for self-starvation. For those 
patients such as Tony Nicklinson and Debbie Purdy, who were unable (or unwilling) to travel, the 
only option to risking potential (albeit unlikely) criminal prosecution for their loved ones was to 
starve themselves to death. Lady Hale observed in her compelling dissenting judgment in the 
Nicklinson appeals that it is  cruel to force the competent adult with conditions such as those 
suffered by Nicklinson, Purdy, Lamb and ‘Martin’ to remain alive for the sake of unknown, 
unidentified others who may or may not be at risk. Lady Hale added ‘it would not be beyond the wit 
of a legal system to devise a process for identifying those people, those few people, who should be 
allowed help to end their own livesxxvi’ With the demise of the Bill, there is unlikely to be a further 
opportunity during the life of this Parliament.   
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